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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1988, Florida amended its constitution to add rights for crime victims.1  90 percent of the voters 
approved this amendment.   Passage of the constitutional provision was a significant effort aimed at re-
integrating victims into criminal justice processes.  Much has been learned in the nearly three decades 
since adoption of Florida’s constitutional victims’ rights amendment.  Lessons regarding the scope, 
structure, and articulation of rights necessary to make the rights meaningful are the subject of this Policy 
Paper, which explains why it is time for Florida to to revisit its state constitutional protections for crime 
victims.   
 
With regard to the scope of rights, consensus has developed around the country that certain rights are 
necessary to secure a meaningful place for victims in criminal justice.  Included among these are the rights 
to notice, presence and a voice throughout the process; to proceedings free from unreasonable delay; to 
consideration of the victims’ safety throughout the process; to respect for victims’ privacy; to protection from 
the accused, including from discovery requests; and to restitution.  With regard to the structure and 
articulation of rights, it has become clear that explicit standing and remedies are necessary to ensure full 
protection of crime victims’ interests in criminal justice.   
  
Crime victims have compelling concerns in the criminal justice system.  No system of criminal justice 
can gain broad community acceptance if it fails to attend appropriately to these concerns.  Over the last 40 
years, acting on a bipartisan basis, the vast majority of states – including, as mentioned, Florida – have 
adopted significant statutory and even constitutional protections for crime victims.  These enactments rest 
on the widely shared premise that “[w]hile defendants have strong interests in fair trials, victims likewise 
have strong personal interests in being listened to and taken seriously.”2  This Policy Paper looks carefully 
at the federal and state crime victims’ rights protections that have become an important—but often 
underappreciated—part of the current architecture in American criminal justice.  While these protections 
differ in detail from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, when examined as a group, many common features emerge.   
 
These common features were not fully apparent in 1998 when Florida enacted its victims’ right 
amendment.  When considering Article I, Section 16(b) of the Florida Constitiution it is clear that many of 
the consensus rights are not included and effective structure and articulation  of the rights is lacking. 
The goal of this Policy Paper is to distill from the victims’ rights enactments around the country a core 
set of shared values for criminal justice– shared values reflected in what is now commonly refered to as 
“Marsy’s Law.”3 This Policy Paper begins by briefly discussing the history of the crime victims’ rights 
movement over the last several decades.  It then reviews crime victims’ enactments to identify the core set 
of values that have emerged.  It finally offers some thoughts about what appears to be the most pressing 
current challenge for crime victims’ rights: the need for effective enforcement.  This Policy Paper concludes 
                                                 
1 See Fla. Const., art. I, section 16(b). 
2 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 91 (2012).  
3 Similar shared values about the importance of victims’ rights exist in foreign and international law as well. See, e.g., HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, MIXED RESULTS: U.S. POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF VICTIMS OF CRIME 
(2008), https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/23/mixed-results/us-policy-and-international-standards-rights-and-interests-victims 
(discussing the many “international human rights instruments [that] address or touch on [crime] victims’ rights”); cf. Marie 
Manikis, Imagining the Future of Victims’ Rights in Canada: A Comparative Perspective, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163 (2015); 
Michael K. Browne, International Victims’ Rights Law: What Can Be Gleaned from the Victims’ Empowerment Procedures in 
Germany as the United States Prepares to Consider the Adoption of a “Victim’s Rights Amendment” to its Constitution, 27 
HAMLINE L. REV. 15 (2004) (discussing German victims’ law).  
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that a strengthened Florida state constitutional amendment  offers the best path for ensuring that crime 
victims’ interests are properly protected in Florida’s criminal justice process. 4    
 
I. THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
 
While a comprehensive history of the treatment of crime victims in the system remains to be written, 
the broad outlines can be quickly sketched.  This backdrop is useful to understanding Florida’s existing 
victims’ rights amendment. 
 
At our country’s founding, crime victims played an important role in criminal prosecutions, often 
bringing their own “private” prosecutions.5  Over time through the 19th century, a system of public 
prosecution steadily displaced victims.6   Ultimately, well into the 20th century, the system had moved to the 
point where it seemed fair to describe the victim as “the forgotten [person]” of the system.7 
 
 The Crime Victims’ Rights Movement developed in the 1970s because of this displacement of victims.  
The victim’s absence from criminal processes conflicted with “a public sense of justice keen enough that it 
… found voice in a nationwide ‘victims’ rights’ movement.”8  Victims’ advocates – who hailed from diverse 
movements including women’s rights, civil rights and “law and order” – urged reforms to give more attention 
to victims’ concerns, including protecting victims’ rights to be notified of court hearings, to attend those 
hearings, and to be heard at appropriate points in the process.9   
 
                                                 
4 The issues discussed in this Policy Paper draw on some earlier articles by the authors also discussing victims’ rights. See, e.g., 
Paul G. Cassell, The Victims’ Rights Amendment: A Sympathetic, Clause-by-Clause Analysis, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 301 (2012); 
Paul G. Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims in Federal Appellate Courts: The Need to Broadly Construe the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Act’s Mandamus Provision, 87 DENV. U.L. REV. 599 (2010); Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role 
in a System of Public Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164 
(2010); Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 861.  
Margaret Garvin & Douglas E. Beloof, Crime Victim Agency: Independent Lawyers for Sexual Assault Victims, 13 Ohio St. J. 
Crim. L. 67 (2015); Meg Garvin & Megan McGill, No Means No: The Need for Vigilance in Sexual Assault Law, Nat'l Crime Victim 
L. Inst. News at Lewis & Clark L. Sch., Spring/Summer 2007.    
5 William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L REV. 649 
(1976).   
6 BIBAS, supra note 2, at 88; Abraham Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 1 (1982); 
Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 1135, 1138-42 
(2007). 
7 McDonald, supra note 5, at 650.  
8 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). See generally DOUGLAS 
EVEN BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3-35 (3d ed. 2010); Douglas Evan Beloof, 
The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289; Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the 
Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373 [hereinafter Cassell, 
Balancing the Scales]; Goldstein, supra note 5; William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A 
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37 (1996); Collene Campbell et al., Appendix: The Victims’ 
Voice, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 379 (2012). 
9 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517.  See generally BELOOF, 
CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 8, at 29-38; Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 
2005 BYU L. REV. 255; Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, supra note 8, at 1380-82. 
The victims’ rights movement received considerable impetus in 1982 when the President’s Task Force 
on Victims of Crime reviewed the treatment of victims.10  In a report issued that year, the task force 
concluded that the criminal justice system “has lost an essential balance. … [T]he system has deprived the 
innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its protection. … The victims of crime have been transformed into 
a group oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect them. This oppression must be 
redressed.”11  The task force advocated multiple reforms, such as prosecutors assuming the responsibility 
for keeping victims notified of all court proceedings and bringing to the court’s attention the victim’s view on 
such subjects as bail, plea bargains, sentences and restitution.12  The task force also urged that courts 
should receive victim-impact evidence at sentencing, order restitution, and allow victims and their families 
to attend trials even if they would be called as witnesses.13  In its most sweeping recommendation, the task 
force proposed a federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims’ rights “to be present and to be 
heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”14 
 
Realizing the difficulty of achieving the consensus required to amend the United States Constitution, 
advocates decided to try to initially enact state victims’ amendments.  They had considerable success with 
this “states first” strategy.15  To date, about 35 states have adopted victims’ rights amendments to their state 
constitutions protecting a wide range of victims’ rights. 
 
These state constitutional amendments have passed in two waves, beginning with Rhode Island’s 
enactment of a statement amendment in 1986.16  Florida’s amendment was one of the very first in the 
nation, and approved in the next election cycle in 1988.17  The Florida provision is extremely brief and 
merely provides: 
 
 
Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of 
homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, 
and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal 
proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the 
constitutional rights of the accused.18 
 
In addition to these state constitutional amendments, during this first wave every state passed 
statutory protections for victims’ rights.  In many states these first wave rights lacked effective enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure that their rights were fully implemented.  As Attorney General Janet Reno explained 
in 1997 after a Justice Department review of the landscape, these state efforts “failed to fully safeguard 
victims’ rights.”19 
                                                 
10 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982), available at  
https://www.ovc.gov/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/welcome.html.   
11 Id. at 114. 
12 Id. at 63. 
13 Id. at 72-73. 
14 Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted). 
15 See S. REP. NO. 108-191 (2003). 
16 RHODE ISLAND CONST. art. I, § 23.  
17 FLA. CONST., art. I, § 16(b).   
18 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 64 (1997) (statement of Janet Reno, U.S. Att’y Gen.). 
 
One way of improving enforcement of state crime victims’ rights enactments is through strengthened 
state constitutional protections.  In 2008, a second wave of state constitutional efforts began.  In November 
2008, California voters overwhelming approved Proposition 9 – Marsy’s Law,20 making California’s 
amendment one of the strongest and most comprehensive in the country. Since then, similar Marsy’s Law 
amendments have been added to the state constitutions of Illinois in 2014,21  North Dakota, and South 
Dakota in 2016,22 and Ohio in 2017.23 Efforts are currently underway to add enhanced state constitutional 
protections for victims in not only Florida, but also Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Nevada, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, among other states.24 
 
The provisions in the more recently-enacted constitutional provisions are much more comprehensive 
than the Florida provision adopted nearly thirty years ago.  Strong model language has been drafted as a 
guide to how to best implement crime victims’ rights.25  An example of how Marsy’s Law might look if added 
specifically to the Florida Constitution is as follows: 
 
(b) To preserve and protect the right of crime victims to 
achieve justice, to ensure a meaningful role throughout the 
criminal and juvenile justice systems for crime victims, and to 
ensure that crime victims’ rights and interests are respected 
and protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than 
protections afforded to criminal defendants and juvenile 
delinquents, every victim is entitled to the following rights, 
beginning at the time of his or her victimization: 
(1) The right to due process and to be treated with 
fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity. 
(2) The right to be free from intimidation, harassment, and 
abuse. 
(3) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused 
and any person acting on behalf of the accused. 
 (4) The right to have the safety and welfare of the victim 
and the victim’s family considered when setting bail, including 
setting pre-trial release conditions that protect the safety and 
welfare of the victim and the victim’s family. 
(5) The right to prevent the disclosure of information or 
records that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the 
victim’s family, or which could disclose confidential or 
privileged information of the victim. 
(6) The right to privacy, which includes the right to 
refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by 
the defense or anyone acting on behalf of the defendant and to 
                                                 
20 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
21 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1. 
22 Respectively, N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25; and S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29. 
23 OHIO CONST., arti I, § 10(a). 
24 See About Marsy’s Law, supra note 19. 
25 https://marsyslaw.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Marsys-Law-Short-Form-Model-Language.pdf 
 
set reasonable conditions on the conduct of any such interaction 
to which the victim consents. 
(7) A victim shall have the following specific rights upon 
request: 
a. The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of, 
and to be present at, all public proceedings involving the 
criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, trial, plea, 
sentencing, or adjudication, even if the victim will be a 
witness at the proceeding, notwithstanding any rule to the 
contrary. A victim shall also be provided reasonable, accurate, 
and timely notice of any release or escape of the defendant or 
delinquent, and any proceeding during which a right of the 
victim is implicated. 
b. The right to be heard in any public proceeding involving 
pretrial or other release from any form of legal constraint, 
plea, sentencing, adjudication, or parole, and any proceeding 
during which a right of the victim is implicated. 
c. The right to confer with the state attorney concerning 
any plea agreements, participation in pre-trial diversion 
programs, release, restitution, sentencing, or any other 
disposition of the case. 
d. The right to provide information regarding the impact of 
the offender’s conduct on the victim and the victim’s family to 
the individual responsible for conducting any pre-sentence 
investigation or compiling any pre-sentence investigation 
report, and to have any such information considered in any 
sentencing recommendations submitted to the court. 
e. The right to receive a copy of any pre-sentence report, 
and any other report or record relevant to the exercise of a 
victim’s right, except for such portions made confidential or 
exempt by law. 
f. The right to be informed of the conviction, sentence, 
adjudication, place and time of incarceration, or other 
disposition of the convicted offender, any scheduled release 
date of the offender, and the release of or the escape of the 
offender from custody. 
g. The right to be informed of all post-conviction 
processes and procedures, to participate in such processes and 
procedures, to provide information to the release authority to 
be considered before any release decision is made, and to be 
notified of any release decision regarding the offender. The 
parole or early release authority shall extend the right to be 
heard to any person harmed by the offender. 
h. The right to be informed of clemency and expungement 
procedures, to provide information to the governor, the court, 
any clemency board, and other authority in these procedures, and 
to have that information considered before a clemency or 
expungement decision is made; and to be notified of such 
decision in advance of any release of the offender. 
(8) The rights of the victim, as provided in subparagraph 
(7)a., subparagraph (7)b., or subparagraph (7)c., that apply to 
any first appearance proceeding are satisfied by a reasonable 
attempt by the appropriate agency to notify the victim and 
convey the victim’s views to the court. 
(9) The right to the prompt return of the victim’s property 
when no longer needed as evidence in the case. 
(10) The right to full and timely restitution in every case 
and from each convicted offender for all losses suffered, both 
directly and indirectly, by the victim as a result of the 
criminal conduct. All monies and property collected from any 
person who has been ordered to make restitution shall be first 
applied to the restitution owed to the victim before paying any 
amounts owed to the government. 
(11) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay, 
and to a prompt and final conclusion of the case and any related 
post-judgment proceedings. 
a. The state attorney may file a good faith demand for a 
speedy trial and the trial court shall hold a hearing within 
five days to schedule a trial within fifteen days unless the 
trial judge enters an order with written findings of fact 
justifying a trial date more than fifteen days after the 
hearing. 
b. All state-level appeals and collateral attacks on any 
judgment must be complete within two years from the date of 
appeal in non-capital cases and five years in capital cases. 
Each year, the Chief Judge of any district court of appeal or 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall report on a case- 
by-case basis to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
the President of the Senate all cases where the court was unable 
to comply with this subparagraph and the circumstances causing 
the delay. The legislature may adopt legislation to implement 
this subparagraph. 
(12) The right to be informed of these rights, and to be 
informed that victims can seek the advice of an attorney with 
respect to their rights. This information shall be made 
available to the general public and provided to all crime 
victims in the form of a card. 
(c) The victim, the retained attorney of the victim, a 
lawful representative of the victim, or the office of the state 
attorney upon request of the victim may assert and seek 
enforcement of the rights enumerated in this section and any 
other right afforded to a victim by law in any trial or 
appellate court, or before any other authority with jurisdiction 
over the case, as a matter of right. The court or other 
authority with jurisdiction shall act promptly on such a 
request, affording a remedy by due course of law for the 
violation of any right. The reasons for any decision regarding 
the disposition of a victim’s right shall be clearly stated on 
the record. 
(d) The granting of these rights enumerated in this section 
to victims may not be construed to deny or impair any other 
rights possessed by victims. The provisions of this section 
apply throughout criminal and juvenile justice processes, are 
self-executing and do not require implementing legislation. 
(e) As used in this section, a “victim” is a person who 
suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or 
financial harm as a result of the commission or attempted 
commission of a crime or delinquent act or against whom the 
crime or delinquent act is committed. The term “victim” shall 
include their lawful representative, the parent or guardian of a 
minor, or the next of kin of a homicide victim, except upon a 
showing that the interest of such individual would be in actual 
or potential conflict with the interests of the victim. The term 
“victim” does not include the accused. The terms “crime” and 
“criminal” include delinquent acts and conduct. Victims of crime 
or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of 
homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to 
be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages 
of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not 
interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. 
 
 
Where does this extensive list of victims’ rights come from?  In the next section, we identify and 
analyze fundamental victims’  rights that are being recognized around the country – rights that Florida 
should recognize in its Constitution. 
 
II. FUNDAMENTAL CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
 
When viewed together, the enactment of state crime victims’ rights amendments across the country 
reveal an emerging consensus that certain victims’ rights should be protected.  This section briefly reviews 
a number of these rights,26 making the case for each of them and then explaining how protection has been 
operationalized in the current state constitutional (and, in some cases, statutory) enactments around the 
country.  Florida should amend its state constitution to explicitly include these important rights.   
 
A. THE RIGHT TO NOTICE OF CASE PROCEEDINGS 
 
A crime victim’s right to notice about criminal proceedings is an important right that is now broadly 
recognized.  Because victims and their families are directly and often irreparably harmed by crime, they 
                                                 
26 In this brief Policy Paper, not every right that might be considered fundamental or important to victims is discussed.  
have a vital interest in knowing about any subsequent prosecution and any associated proceedings.  Notice 
of proceedings is traditionally recognized as a core part of due process.27  While victims may not suffer a 
loss of physical liberty through confinement as the result of a criminal proceeding, they certainly have 
strong claim to be kept fully informed about the progress of a criminal case.  Knowing what is happening 
can, for example, greatly reduce a victim’s anxiety about the process.28  For reasons such as these, the 
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime urged that “[p]rosecutors should keep victims informed about 
the status of the case from the initial decision to charge or to decline prosecution.”29  
 
To guarantee that victims will be kept informed about the progress of court cases, many state 
constitutional and statutory provisions promise crime victims that they will be notified about proceedings. 
The California Constitution, for example, guarantees crime victims “reasonable notice” of all public 
proceedings.30  And the Texas Constitution promises “the right to notification of court proceedings … on the 
request of a crime victim.”31 
 
Some state provisions spell out notification rights in more detail.  For example, Utah has enacted the 
Utah Rights of Crime Victims Act, which provides that “[w]ithin seven days of the filing of felony criminal 
charges against a defendant, the prosecuting agency shall provide an initial notice to reasonably 
identifiable and locatable victims of the crime contained in the charges.”32  The initial notice must contain 
information about “electing to receive notice of subsequent important criminal justice hearings.”33  In 
practice, Utah prosecuting agencies have provided these notices with a detachable postcard or, more 
recently, a computer-generated letter that victims simply return to the prosecutor’s office to receive 
subsequent notices about proceedings.  The return letter serves as the victims’ request for further notices.  
In the absence of such a request, a prosecutor need not send any further notices.34  
 
Fortunately, with developing new electronic technologies, keeping victims informed about court 
hearings is becoming easier.35  Automated victim-notification systems abound, most prominently the so-
called VINE (Victim Information Notification Everyday) system.36  Under such a system, a victim registers 
for notification through e-mail or phone call.  Then, when court hearings are scheduled, a computerized 
notification is made. 
 
In some cases (e.g., terrorist bombings or massive financial frauds), the large number of victims may 
render individual notifications impractical.  In such circumstances, notice by means of a press release to 
daily newspapers in the area has been regarded as a reasonable alternative to actual notice sent to each 
victim at his/her/their residential address.37  New technologies may also provide a way of affording 
reasonable notice.  For example, some federal courts have approved notice by publication, where the 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Dusenberg v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002).  
28 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, , supra note 10, at 64 (quoting victim to this effect).  
29 Id.  
30 CAL. CONST., art. I, § 28(b)(7). 
31 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (order rearranged). 
32 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-3(1). See generally Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note 8. 
33 Id. § 77-38-3(2). The notice will also contain information about other rights under the victims’ statute. Id. 
34 Id. § 77-38-3(8); see also Steven J. Twist & Keelah E.G. Williams, Twenty-Five Years of Victims’ Rights in Arizona, 47 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 421, 434 (2015) (discussing victim notification in Arizona).  
35 See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 150 (“With the advent of email, notifying victims . . . is even easier”).  
36 See, e.g., VINE, APPRISS SAFETY, https://apprisssafety.com/solutions/vine/.  
37 United States v. Peralta, No. 3:08cr233, 2009 WL 2998050, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2009). 
publication directs crime victims to a website maintained by the government with hyperlinks to updates on 
the case.38 
 
B. THE RIGHT TO ATTEND COURT HEARINGS 
 
Victims also deserve the right to attend all proceedings related to a crime, as is recognized across the 
country.  The President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime articulated the basis for this right: “The crime is 
often one of the most significant events in the lives of victims and their families.  They, no less than the 
defendant, have a legitimate interest in the fair adjudication of the case, and should therefore, as an 
exception to the general rule providing for the exclusion of witnesses, be permitted to be present for the 
entire trial.”39 
 
Several strong reasons support such a right. As Professor Doug Beloof and one of this paper’s 
authors have argued at length elsewhere,40 the right to attend the trial may be critical in allowing the victim 
to recover from the psychological damage of a crime.  It is widely recognized that the “victim’s presence 
during the trial may also facilitate healing of the debilitating psychological wounds suffered by a crime 
victim.”41 
 
Moreover, without a right to attend the trial, “the criminal justice system merely intensifies the loss of 
control that victims feel after the crime.”42  It should come as no surprise that “[v]ictims are often appalled to 
learn that they may not be allowed to sit in the courtroom during hearings or the trial.  They are unable to 
understand why they cannot simply observe the proceedings in a supposedly public forum.”43  One crime 
victim put it more directly: “All we ask is that we be treated just like a criminal.”44  Defendants take full 
advantage of their right to be in the courtroom.45   
 
To ensure that victims can attend court proceedings, many state amendments extend to a crime victim 
an unqualified right to attend trial,46 while others extend a qualified right to attend unless the victim’s 
testimony would be materially affected by attendance.47  Often such provisions give victims a right not to be 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., United States v. Skilling, No. H-04-025-SS, 2009 WL 806757, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2009); United States v. 
Saltsman, No. 07-CR-641 (NGG), 2007 WL 4232985, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); United States v. Croteau, No. 05-CR-
30104-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23684, at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. 2006). 
39 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 80. 
40 See Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim’s Right to Attend the Trial: The Reascendant National Consensus, 
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481 (2005). 
41 Ken Eikenberry, Victims of Crimes/Victims of Justice, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 41 (1987). 
42 Deborah P. Kelly, Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 69, 72 (1987). 
43 Marlene A. Young, A Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victims’ Perspective, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 51, 58 
(1987). 
44 Id. at 59 (quoting Edmund Newton, Criminals Have All the Rights, LADIES’ HOME J., Sept. 1986). 
45 See LINDA E. LEDRAY, RECOVERING FROM RAPE 199 (2d ed. 1994) (“Even the most disheveled [rapist] will turn up in court clean-
shaven, with a haircut, and often wearing a suit and tie. He will not appear to be the type of man who could rape.”). 
46 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (right “to be present at all criminal ... proceedings where the accused has the right to be 
present”); MICH. CONST., art. I, § 24(1) (right “to attend the trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to 
attend”); OR. R. EVID. 615 (witness exclusion rule does not apply to “victim in a criminal case”); see also Beloof & Cassell, supra 
note 40, at 504-19 (providing a comprehensive discussion of state law on this subject). 
47 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (“Victims of crime or their lawful representatives ... are entitled to the right ... to be present 
... at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of 
the accused”).  See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 960.001(1)(e) (re “guidelines”) (“A victim, a victim's parent or guardian if the victim is a 
minor, a lawful representative of the victim or of the victim's parent or guardian if the victim is a minor, or a victim's next of kin 
excluded from public proceedings.  When the right is phrased in the negative—a right not to be excluded—
it avoids the possible suggestion that a right “to attend” carried with it a victim’s right to demand payment 
from the government for travel to court.48  Such an unqualified right does not interfere with a defendant’s 
right for the simple reason that defendants have no constitutional right to exclude victims from the 
courtroom.49 
 
C. THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD AT RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS 
 
Many states have also recognized that crime victims deserve the right to be heard at points in the 
criminal justice process, thus allowing victims to participate directly in criminal justice.  Allowing such victim 
participation can provide important information to judges.  Having the actual victim speak is useful because 
“gauging the harm to a unique human being, not a faceless abstraction, requires evidence of how that 
particular victim suffered.”50 And victim participation can lead to important therapeutic benefits.  As 
Professor Bibas has explained at length in his important book The Machinery of Criminal Justice, “it is 
simple participation that helps to empower and heal victims. Participants see the law as more fair and 
legitimate when they have some control over the process and they have been heard, whether or not they 
control ultimate outcomes.”51  Hearing victim voices can be important regardless of any formal effect on 
criminal penalties, as recent experience with “reconciliation commissions” in other countries attests.52 
 
Recognizing such benefits, states have extended a right to participate in various ways.  For example, 
the recently enacted constitutional provision in South Dakota promises crime victims the “the right to be 
heard in any proceeding involving release, plea, sentencing, adjudication, disposition or parole, and any 
proceeding during which a right of the victim is implicated.”53 A number of states have similar provisions to 
their state constitutions guaranteeing victim participation.54 
 
                                                 
may not be excluded from any portion of any hearing, trial, or proceeding pertaining to the offense based solely on the fact that 
such person is subpoenaed to testify, unless, upon motion, the court determines such person's presence to be prejudicial.”); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 90.616(2)(d) (re evidentiary rule on exclusion of witnesses) (“A witness may not be excluded if the witness is . . . .  In 
a criminal case, the victim of the crime, the victim's next of kin, the parent or guardian of a minor child victim, or a lawful 
representative of such person, unless, upon motion, the court determines such person's presence to be prejudicial.”). 
48 Cf. ALA. CODE § 15-14-54 (right “not [to] be excluded from court ... during the trial or hearing or any portion thereof ... which in 
any way pertains to such offense”).  This negative formulation may be excessive caution, because no right-to-be-present 
provision has been interpreted to require the State to pay for victims to travel. 
49 See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 40, at 520-34; see, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 526 F.3d 747, 757-58 (11th Cir. 2008). 
50 BIBAS, supra note 2, at 91; see also Laurence H. Tribe, McVeigh’s Victims Had a Right to Speak, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1997, at 
A25.  
51 BIBAS, supra note 2, at 151.  
52 See, e.g., Mary Burton, Custodians of Memory: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 
417 (2004).  
53 S.D. CONST. art VI, § 29. 
54 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art II, § 2.1(A)(4) (right to be heard at proceedings involving post-arrest release, negotiated pleas, and 
sentencing); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (right to be heard at critical stages); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(4) (right to make statement at 
sentencing); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 15(a) (right to be heard at sentencing or any other appropriate time); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 
24(1) (right to make statement at sentencing); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(1)(2) (right to be heard at guilty pleas, bail hearings, 
sentencings, probation revocation hearings, and parole hearings, unless interests of justice require otherwise); N.M. CONST. art. 
II, § 24(A)(7) (right to make statement at sentencing and post-sentencing hearings); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 (right to address court 
at sentencing); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (right to make statement at sentencing or release proceeding); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m 
(opportunity to make statement to court at disposition); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(b) (right to be heard at important 
proceedings).  
The existing state amendments frequently recognize several points in the process as appropriate 
times for crime victims to be heard.  First, the amendments commonly extend the right to be heard 
regarding any release proceeding—e.g., bail hearings.  This right ensures the court can hear directly from 
the victim but nothing in these rights gives victims the ability to veto the release or detention of any 
defendant; the ultimate decision to hold or release a defendant remains with the judge. Similarly, when 
considering later release such as parole, victim statements to parole boards “can enable the board to fully 
appreciate the nature of the offense and the degree to which the particular inmate may present risks to the 
victim or community upon release.”55 
 
The right to be heard also typically extends to any proceeding involving a plea bargain. Under the 
present rules of procedure in most states, a plea bargain between the prosecution and a defendant must be 
submitted to the trial judge for approval.56  If the judge believes that the bargain is not in the interests of 
justice, she may reject it.57 Unfortunately in some states, a victim does not always have the opportunity to 
discuss a plea with the prosecution while it is being negotiated58 or to present to the judge information 
about whether the plea is in the interests of justice.  Indeed, it may be that in some cases, “keeping the 
victim away from the judge … is one of the prime motivations for plea bargaining.”59  Yet there are 
compelling reasons to afford victims a role in the plea bargaining process: 
 
The victim’s interests in participating in the plea bargaining process are 
many. The fact that they are consulted and listened to provide them with 
respect and an acknowledgment that they are the harmed individual.  This 
in turn may contribute to the psychological healing of the victim.  The victim 
may have financial interests in the form of restitution or compensatory fine. 
… [B]ecause judges act in the public interest when they decide to accept or 
reject a plea bargain, the victim is an additional source of information for 
the court.60 
 
As with the right to be heard regarding release, victims have a voice in the plea bargaining process, 
not a veto.  The judge is not required to follow the victim’s suggested course of action on the plea, but 
simply has more information on which to base such a determination. 
 
                                                 
55 Frances P. Bernat et al., Victim Impact Laws and the Parole Process in the United States: Balancing Victim and Inmate Rights 
and Interests, 3 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 121, 134 (1994); see also Laura L. Richardson, The Impact of Marsy’s Law on Parole in 
California, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 1091 (2013) (discussing changes in parole hearings after Marsy’s law enactment); Kathryne M. 
Young, Parole Hearings and Victims’ Rights: Implementation, Ambiguity, and Reform, 49 CONN. L. REV. 431 (2016).  
56 See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 8, at 422 (discussing this issue).   
57 See, e.g., UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (“The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty ....”); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (following Rule 11(e) and holding “[n]othing in the statute requires a court to accept a guilty plea”). 
58 See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial 
Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 377 (2016) (discussing diversity in practice about victim involvement in plea 
negotiations).  
59 HERBERT S. MILLER ET AL., PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1978). 
60 BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 2, at 423. See generally Elizabeth N. Jones, The Ascending Role of Crime Victims in 
Plea-Bargaining and Beyond, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 97 (2014) (discussing victims’ rights during plea); Sarah N. Welling, Victim 
Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (1987) (advancing reasons for victim participation in plea discussions); 
Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 330-32 (2007) (victim 
involvement in plea bargains improves perception of fair treatment and increases public confidence in the process).  
State amendments also typically extend to victims the right to be heard at proceedings for determining 
a sentence.  Defendants, of course, have the right to directly address the sentencing authority before 
sentence is imposed.61  Victims’ enactments typically extend the same basic right to victims.62  The reasons 
for this right are many.63  It is important to emphasize that victims “are not reflexively punitive” and a 
number of “[e]mpirical studies find that participation by victims does not lead to harsher sentences.”64  Nor 
does the claim that victims’ impact statements might be somehow “emotional” carry much weight, given that 
many other parts of the law recognize that it is proper to have such arguments.65  
 
Victims can exercise their right to be heard in any appropriate fashion, including making an oral 
statement at court proceedings or submitting written information for the court’s consideration.  Defendants 
can respond to the information that victims provide in appropriate ways, such as providing counter-
information.66 
 
Finally, many state amendments extend to a victim a general right to be heard at any proceeding 
involving any right established by the amendment.  This allows victims to present information in support of 
a claim of right under the amendments, consistent with ordinary due-process principles.67 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 32(i)(4)(A); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(a). 
62 See generally NORMA DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 349-58 (3d ed. 
2013) (discussing victim impact statements).  See also Cozzie v. State, No. SC13-2393, 2017 WL 1954976, at *9 (Fla. May 11, 
2017) (recognizing that crime victims’ state constitutional right to be heard at crucial stages supports the admission of victim 
impact evidence at sentencing). 
63 Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611 (2009) (collecting rationales for the right 
including that victim-impact statements provide information to the sentencer, have therapeutic and other benefits for victims, 
explain the crime’s harm to the defendant, and improve the perceived fairness of sentencing, and noting that all 50 states provide 
victims the opportunity for a victim impact statment). 
64 BIBAS, supra note 2, at 91; see also Cassell, supra note 64, at 634-37 (“good evidence that victim impact statements generally 
lead to harsher sentences is lacking”); Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victims? Victim Impact Statements as Victim 
Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice, 1999 CRIM. L. REV. 545, 548 (“sentence severity has not increased following the 
passage of [victim impact] legislation”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in South 
Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 308 (2003) (“We find [no] significant relation between the introduction of [victim 
impact evidence] and sentencing outcomes.”); EDWIN VILLMOARE & VIRGINIA N. NETO, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, VICTIM APPEARANCES AT SENTENCING HEARINGS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA VICTIMS’ BILL OF RIGHTS 61 
(1987) (“[t]he right to allocution at sentencing has had little net effect ... on sentences in general”); Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. 
Smith, The Effects of Victim Impact Statements on Sentencing Decisions: A Test in an Urban Setting, 11 JUST. Q. 453, 466 
(1994) (finding “no support for those who argue against [victim impact] statements on the grounds that their use places 
defendants in jeopardy”); ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS: THEIR EFFECTS ON COURT OUTCOMES AND VICTIM 
SATISFACTION 68 (1990) (concluding that the result of the study “lend[s] support to advocates of victim impact statements” since 
no evidence indicates that these statements “put[] defendants in jeopardy [or] result in harsher sentences”); cf. Stephanos Bibas 
& Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 137 (2004) (“Victims do 
not want vengeance so much as additional rights to participate.”); but cf. Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof 
and Prejudice: The Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1050 (2014) 
(discussing limitations of the current studies and making suggestions for future research); Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. 
Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 166-67 (2012) (arguing that mock jury research shows victim 
impact evidence leads to punitiveness).  
65 Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 355, 356 (2008) (“Rather 
than bemoaning emotional reactions, reformers should acknowledge emotion as the legitimate battlefield of criminal justice.”); 
Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 486-
96 (victim impact statements convey information, not emotion).  
66 See generally Paul G. Cassell & Edna Erez, Victim Impact Statements and Ancillary Harm: The American Perspective, 15 
CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 149, 175-96 (2011) (providing a fifty state survey on procedures concerning victim impact statements). 
67 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has 
been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 
D. THE RIGHT TO PROCEEDINGS FREE FROM UNREASONABLE DELAY 
 
Many state provisions also extend to crime victims the right to “a speedy trial and a prompt and final 
conclusion of the case”68 or to proceedings “free from unreasonable delay.”69 Such provisions are designed 
to be the victim’s analogue to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.70  The defendant’s 
right is designed, among other things, “to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation” 
and “to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.”71 The 
interests underlying a speedy trial, however, are not confined to defendants. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that “there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at 
times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.”72 
 
Victims often suffer significantly from delays in the criminal justice system.73  For example, victims of 
violent crime frequently suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).74  A connection between initial 
victimization and later depression, substance abuse, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and even suicide has also been reported in the academic literature.75  Delays in the 
criminal process can then exacerbate these initial injuries.  Indeed, a “common problem in the prosecution 
of crimes against victims is that the trial is typically delayed through scheduling conflicts, continuances, and 
other unexpected delays throughout the course of the trial.”76  It thus is not surprising that multiple studies 
suggest “the negative effect on a victim’s healing process when there is a prolonged trial of the alleged 
attacker because the actual judicial process is a burden on the victim.”77 And “[t]he long delay between 
reporting a crime to the police and the beginning of the trial represents [a] source of psychological stress for 
crime victims.”78 
Academic literature confirms the ways in which delays in the criminal justice system can compound 
the crime’s initial effects on a victim.79  A victim’s experience with the justice system often “means the 
difference between a healing experience and one that exacerbates the initial trauma.”80  
                                                 
68 See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. I, § 28(b)(9).  
69 See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(10); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 29; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(6); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1); MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 32(1)(5); WIS. CONST. art I, § 9m.  The right may also exist in statute.  See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 960.001(1)(a)(7) 
(requiring law enforcement to inform victims of “[t] he right of a victim to a prompt and timely disposition of the case in order to 
minimize the period during which the victim must endure the responsibilities and stress involved to the extent that this right does 
not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused”). 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial ....”). 
71 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969) (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)). 
72 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). 
73 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Arizona Voice for Crime Victims (AVCV) at 6-9, Ryan v. Washington, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (Feb. 2017) 
(No. 16-840) (collecting research). This section draws heavily on the research collected in the AVCV brief.  
74 See Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. TRAUM. STRESS 
182, 182 (2010); Dean G. Kilpatrick & Ron Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime Victims: Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J. 
TRAUM. STRESS 119, 119 (2003).  
75 Parsons & Bergin, supra note 74, at 182.  
76 Mary Beth Ricke, Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings, Improvements, and Alternatives to Legislative Protection, 41 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 181, 183 (2013).  
77 Id. at 193.  
78 Ulrich Orth & Andreas Maercker, Do Trials of Perpetrators Retraumatize Victims?, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 212, 215 
(2004).  
79 Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 16 J. TRAUM. STRESS 159, 159 (2003).  
80 Parsons & Bergin, supra note 74, at 182; see laso Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 585 (2006) (“Both the State and the 
victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.”); Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel Gold in 
a Hill of Beans, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 311, 322.  
 
Delays in proceedings can also be particularly hard on child victims, who have difficulty healing until 
the anxiety of legal proceedings can be brought to an end.81   
 
State provisions affording victims the right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay do not require 
courts to follow victims’ demands for scheduling trial or for ending all delay, but rather insure against 
“unreasonable” delay.82  In interpreting these provisions, courts can look to the body of case law that 
already exists for resolving defendants’ speedy-trial claims.83  
 
E. THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM THE ACCUSED 
 
The criminal justice system is intended, in part, to protect victims.  Victims are usually in the best 
position to know what protections will and will not be effective, which means considering the victim’s input 
regarding protection is absolutely critical as is timely communication regarding such protections to allow for 
execution of safety plans when necessary. 
 
Defendants and convicted offenders who are released may pose a special danger to their victims.  An 
unconvicted defendant may threaten or carry out violence to permanently silence the victim and prevent 
subsequent testimony.  Or a convicted offender may later attack the victim in a quest for revenge.  These 
dangers are particularly pronounced for victims of domestic violence and rape. For instance, Colleen 
McHugh obtained a restraining order against her former boyfriend Eric Boettcher on January 12, 1994.84  
Authorities soon placed him in jail for violating that order.85  He later posted bail and tracked McHugh to a 
relative’s apartment, where on January 20, 1994, he fatally shot both Colleen McHugh and himself.86  No 
one had notified McHugh of Boettcher’s release from custody.87 
 
In an attempt to prevent such travesties, in addition to the rights to be heard regarding release and to 
protection, a number of states have enacted constitutional provisions requiring notice to crime victims 
whenever an offender will no longer in custody.88 California’s amendment, for example, gives victims, upon 
request, the right to be informed of “the scheduled release date of the defendant, and the release of or the 
                                                 
81 Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, supra note 8, at 1402-07.  
82 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 931 (D. Utah 2005) (interpreting CVRA’s right to proceedings free 
from unreasonable delay to preclude delay in sentencing). 
83 For example, in Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court set forth various factors that could be used to evaluate a 
defendant’s speedy-trial challenge in the wake of a delay. 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972) (describing factors such as: (1) the length 
of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether and when the defendant asserted his speedy-trial right; and (4) whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the delay).  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.2 (4th ed. 2009 & 2017 
Supp.). 
84 Jeffrey A. Cross, The Repeated Sufferings of Domestic Violence Victims Not Notified of Their Assailant’s Pre-Trial Release 
from Custody: A Call for Mandatory Domestic Violence Victim Notification Legislation, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 915, 915-16 
(1996). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. (providing this and other examples). 
88 While Florida does not have a constitional provision regarding these rights there are statutory protections regarding notice of 
release.  See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 960.001(1)(e) (requiring notice to victims of “[t] he release of the accused pending judicial 
proceedings” and “when a term of imprisonment, detention, or residential commitment is imposed, the release of the defendant 
or juvenile offender from such imprisonment, detention, or residential commitment”); id. at § 960.001(1)(e) (requiring notice to 
victims of any escape from a state facility). 
escape by the defendant from custody.”89 Other states have comparable requirements.90 These provisions 
ensure that victims are not surprised to discover that an offender is back on the streets.  Generally, notice is 
provided in either of two circumstances: either a release, which could include a post-arrest release or the 
post-conviction paroling of a defendant or a pardon,91 or an escape.  The administrative burdens 
associated with such notification requirements have recently been minimized by technological advances.  
As noted earlier in this paper, many states have developed computer-operated programs that can place a 
telephone call to a programmed number when a prisoner is moved from one prison to another or 
released.92 
 
F. THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION AND CONSIDERATION OF THE VICTIM’S SAFETY 
 
Given the safety concerns of a crime victim in a criminal case, a number of states have also 
recognized a specific right for crime victims to have their safety considered during court proceedings.  For 
example, about 15 states extend to victims the constitutional right to be reasonably protected from the 
accused—such as the California constitutional provision extending a right to victims to “be reasonably 
protected from the defendant and persons acting on behalf of the defendant” and to “have the safety of the 
victim and the victim’s family considered in fixing the amount of bail and release conditions for the 
defendant.”93  Virginia extends to victims “[t]he right to protection from further harm or reprisal through the 
imposition of appropriate bail and conditions of release.”94  Sometimes such enactments are supplemented 
by giving victims the right to be free from harassment.95  Federal law, too, gives victims “[t]he right to be 
reasonably protected from the accused.”96 
 
These provisions are designed to require that a crime victim’s safety be considered by courts, parole 
boards, and other government actors in making discretionary decisions that could harm a crime victim.97  
For example, in considering whether to release a suspect on bail, a court following such a provision is 
required to consider the victim’s safety.  This dovetails with the earlier-discussed provisions giving victims a 
right to speak at proceedings involving bail.98 Once again, it is important to emphasize that nothing in these 
                                                 
89 CAL. CONST. art. I, section 28(b)(12).  
90 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (victim’s right to “be informed, upon request, when the accused or convicted person is 
released from custody or has escaped”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“victims of a crime have a right to ... be reasonably informed 
when the accused or convicted is arrested, released from custody, or has escaped”); MICH. CONST. art I, § 24 (crime victims have 
the right to information about the conviction, sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused”).  
91 Mary Margaret Giannini, Measured Mercy: Managing the Intersection of Executive Pardon Power and Victims’ Rights with 
Procedural Justice Principles, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 89 (2015). 
92 See, e.g., VINELINK, https://www.vinelink.com. 
93 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(2)-(3). 
94 VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A. 
95 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(1) (victims have a right to “be treated with fairness and respect for his or her privacy and 
dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, and abuse, throughout the criminal or juvenile justice process”); TENN. 
CONST. art. I, § 35 (victims shall be entitled to the “right to be free from intimidation, harassment and abuse throughout the 
criminal justice system”); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1 (crime victims have the right to “right to be treated with fairness and respect for 
their dignity and privacy and to be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse throughout the criminal justice process”). 
96 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (2006). See generally Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural Justice, the 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to be Reasonably Protected from the Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 85-96 
(2010). 
97 In the case of a mandatory release of an offender (e.g., releasing a defendant who has served the statutory maximum term of 
imprisonment), there is no such discretionary consideration to be made of a victim’s safety.  
98 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
provisions binds a court. Rather, the provisions merely establish a requirement that due consideration be 
given to such concerns in the process of determining release. 
 
G. THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND DIGNITY 
 
Victims also have considerable privacy and dignity interests at stake in criminal proceedings.99  
Sexual-assault victims, for example, suffer the ultimate invasion of privacy from the crime, and run the risk 
of continued loss of privacy during the criminal justice process.100  A criminal justice system should be 
structured so that it avoids unnecessary invasions of privacy and insults to dignity.101 
 
Recognizing the legitimacy of protecting such victims’ interests, about 20 states extend specific 
protections to crime victims for protection of their privacy and dignity interests.  For example, California 
promises a victim a right “[t]o be treated with fairness and respect for his or her privacy and dignity.”102 
Arizona promises crime victims the right “[t]o be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity … throughout the 
criminal justice process.”103 And Indiana extends to victims “the right to be treated with fairness, dignity and 
respect throughout the criminal justice process.”104  Federal law, too, guarantees crime victims “[t]he right to 
be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.”105 
 
The precise scope of these general rights remains to be fully defined.  At a minimum, such provisions 
provide constitutional dignity to various other enactments that help protect victim privacy.  For example, 
some states have enacted so-called victim-counselor privilege laws, which enable victim counselors to 
maintain the confidentiality of information revealed to them by crime victims, subject of course to 
constitutional disclosure obligations.106  Constitutional protection for victims’ privacy may help to ensure that 
such statutes operate as intended.107 
 
As a way of developing the right of privacy, the proposed Florida amendment would specifically 
provide that the right of privacy “includes the right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery 
request by the defense or anyone acting on behalf of the defendant and to set reasonable conditions on the 
conduct of any such interaction to which the victim consents.”  Other states have adopted virtually identical 
provisions.108   
                                                 
99 See generally Mary Graw Leary, The Third Dimension of Victimization, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 139 (2015). 
100 See Paul Marcus & Tora McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims’ Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1991).  
101 Mary Margaret Giannini, The Procreative Power of Dignity: Dignity’s Evolution in the Victims’ Rights Movement, 9 DREXEL L. 
REV. 43 (2016). 
102 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(1). 
103 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1. 
104 IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b).  
105 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).  
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Florida law currently has an unusual procedure, in which victims in criminal cases can be deposed 
before trial.109  Less than a dozen states allow victims to be deposed as a basic discovery procedure.110  In 
the vast majority of the states and in the federal system, the deposition is available in criminal cases 
primarily for the purpose of preserving the testimony of a witness likely to be unavailable at trial.111  The 
proposed changes are a compromise approach, moving Florida law in the direction of the vast majority of 
other states.  Under the proposed changes, a defendant would continue to be allowed to seek to depose a 
victim, but the victim would have the right to refuse that request or impose reasonable conditions on it. 
 
H. THE RIGHT TO RESTITUTION 
 
Finally, all states have recognized, to some degree, a crime victim’s right to restitution,112 and about 20 
states have added a state constitutional right to restitution.  For example, Illinois promises to a crime victim 
simply “[t]he right to restitution.”113 North Carolina extends to a crime victim “[t]he right as prescribed by law 
to receive restitution.”114 The California Constitution contains perhaps the most elaborate provision: 
 
 (A) It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California 
that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have 
the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the 
crimes causing the losses they suffer. 
(B) Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every 
case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime 
victim suffers a loss. 
(C) All monetary payments, monies, and property collected from any 
person who has been ordered to make restitution shall be first applied to 
pay the amounts ordered as restitution to the victim.115 
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Congress has also enacted broad restitution provisions in the federal system.  In the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act,116 Congress required federal courts to enter a restitution order in favor of victims for 
crimes of violence. The law provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a 
defendant convicted of [a crime of violence as defined elsewhere,] the court shall order … that the 
defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.”117 In justifying this approach, the Judiciary 
Committee explained that “the principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every formal system of 
criminal justice, of every culture and every time.”118 While restitution is critically important, the committee 
also found that restitution orders were only sometimes entered and, in general, “much progress remains to 
be made in the area of victim restitution.”119 Accordingly, restitution was made mandatory for crimes of 
violence in federal cases.  
 
The exact contours of these restitution provisions are yet to be defined.  While some decisions 
interpret restitution provisions broadly to ensure that victims have been made whole,120 other courts appear 
to be unwilling to give any real content to constitutional protections for a victim’s right to restitution.121 And 
new crimes have posed particularly vexing challenges, such as the issues surrounding how to provide full 
restitution for victims of child-pornography crimes when many widely distributed offenders are responsible 
for the victims’ losses.122  
 
Under restitution provisions, courts are often required to enter an order of restitution against the 
convicted offender.  However, frequently offenders lack the means to make full restitution payments 
immediately.  Accordingly, even in the face of full restitution orders, the courts can establish an appropriate 
repayment schedule and enforce it during the period of time in which the offender is under the court’s 
jurisdiction.123  
 
In determining the contours of the victims’ restitution right, well-established bodies of law can be 
examined.124 Moreover, details are often explicated in implementing legislation accompanying state 
amendments.  For instance, in determining the compensable losses, an implementing statute might rely on 
the current federal statute, which includes among the compensable losses medical and psychiatric 
services, physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation, lost income, the costs of attending the trial, 
and in the case of homicide, funeral expenses.125  It is important to understand that victims’ interests and 
defendants’ interests can sometimes align on restitution. A defendant who pays restitution may be able to 
raise a well-deserved claim for mitigation of other penalties, perhaps gaining a shorter term of 
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imprisonment or perhaps even no imprisonment at all so that he can continue to work and make restitution 
payments to victims.126 
 
III. THE FUTURE OF CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN FLORIDA  
 
Given the emerging consensus concerning victims’ rights as reflected in many state constitutions as 
well as in federal law, Florida should not simply rest on the nearly thirty-year-old provison currently in its 
constitution.127  Instead, Florida should, through its established and recognized procedures, expand the 
protections contained in its provision to cover the rights reflected in provisions enacted across the country 
and reflected in Marsy’s Law.   
 
Looking at the roughly 35 states where victims’ rights amendments currently exist, Florida’s 
amendment is among the most limited.  This is unsurprising since, as noted earlier, Florida was one of the 
very first states to adopt constitutional protections for crime victims in 1988.  In the nearly three decades 
since, we have learned a great deal about protecting crime victims’ rights – knowledge that should be 
imported into the Florida Constitution.   
 
Related to these coverage limitations are implementation problems. Victims’ rights advocates have 
long been concerned that current enactments “frequently fail to provide meaningful protection whenever 
they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, [or] sheer inertia.”128 As the Justice 
Department reported in 1997: 
 
 [E]fforts to secure victims’ rights through means other than a constitutional 
amendment have proved less than fully adequate. Victims[’] rights 
advocates have sought reforms at the State level for the past 20 years and 
many States have responded with State statutes and constitutional 
provisions that seek to guarantee victims’ rights. However, these efforts 
have failed to fully safeguard victims’ rights. These significant State efforts 
simply are not sufficiently consistent, comprehensive, or authoritative to 
safeguard victims’ rights.129 
 
While more recent and comprehensive statistics are lacking, the general consensus appears to be that 
victims’ rights “enforcement is wildly uneven.”130 The limited statistics that are available present cause for 
concern.  Consider, for example, one of the seemingly simplest rights to extend: the right to notice of court 
hearings. In the federal system, despite the CVRA extending a right to notice to crime victims (and the 
availability of federal resources), many victims continue to be unaware of that right. A GAO report, for 
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example, found that approximately 25 percent of the responding federal crime victims were unaware of 
their right to notice of court hearings.131 Even larger percentages of failure to provide required notices were 
found in a survey of (presumably less well-funded) state criminal justice systems.132 Distressingly, the same 
survey found that racial minorities were less likely to be notified than their white counterparts.133 
 
Against this backdrop, it would make sense to push for strengthening of prominence and enforcement 
of the crime victims’ provision in the Florida Constituion.  The Marsy’s Law formulation adopted recently in 
other states contains clear enforcement mechanisms for crime victims, by directly providing standing to 
pursue judicial enforcement134 as well as the right to a prompt trial-court decision and, if necessary, 
appellate review. Such clear provisions—lodged in state constitutions—offer the mechanism for fully 
vindicating crime victims’ important interests. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
To ensure appropriate protection for crime victims in the criminal justice process, Florida  should 
amend its existing crime victims rights provision by adopting a more comprehensive “Marsy’s Law”  
provision as soon as possible.   
                                                 
131 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT: INCREASING AWARENESS, MODIFYING THE COMPLAINT PROCESS, 
AND ENHANCING COMPLIANCE MONITORING WILL IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT 82 (Dec. 2008). 
132 National Victim Center, Comparison of White and Non-White Crime Victim Responses Regarding Victims’ Rights, in BELOOF, 
CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 8, at 631-34. 
133 Id.   
134 See Lawrence Schlam, Enforcing Victims’ Rights in Illinois: The Rationale for Victim “Standing” in Criminal Prosecutions, 49 
VAL. U.L. REV. 597 (2015).  
